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Intra-Enterprise Activity, Joint Ventures and Sports Leagues: 
Identifying Unilateral Conduct under the Antitrust Laws 
Herbert Hovenkamp* 
 
While §1 of the Sherman Act (as well as §3 of the Clayton Act) require a 
“contract” or “agreement” between two or more persons, neither statute identifies 
in significant detail the entities to which its prohibitions refer other than to say that 
both corporations and natural persons are covered. Historically and today, 
concerted action by persons within a single corporation is not a “contract, 
combination…or conspiracy” within the meaning of Sherman Act §1.  For 
example, when General Motors sets the price of a new model of automobile, its 
decision almost certainly involves joint deliberation by many biological persons, 
and perhaps even an “agreement” among them at the conclusion of the meeting. 
To apply §1’s full prohibitions to this “price-fixing,” however, would condemn and 
even criminalize absolutely unitary price setting by a single firm—or single 
economic actor as far as our markets are concerned.  Thus the Supreme Court 
held in Copperweld that business decisions made within a single firm, even a 
parent and its subsidiary, must be counted as unilateral acts.1 
At the same time, at least some decisions of certain organizations—such as 
trade associations, professional associations, and some joint ventures—are 
rightfully treated as concerted decisions by the members. For example, the rules 
promulgated by the California Dental Association, the NCAA,  the New York 
Stock Exchange, the Associated Press, and the National Society of Professional 
Engineers are regarded not as the unilateral acts of those entities but as the 
conspiracies of their members. 
The courts have had little difficulty in treating organizations created to serve 
their member-competitors or to regulate their market behavior as continuing 
agreements of the members. Nor is there any practical problem when we focus 
on those improprieties reducing competition among the members or with their 
competitors. But what about the day-to-day operations of the organization? Must 
we also see the trade association's buying, selling, hiring, renting, or investing 
decisions as continuing conspiracies among the members? For example, is a 
trade association's decision to have its annual convention in New York rather 
than Missouri a “concerted refusal to deal” with Missouri? To be sure, an 
affirmative answer would seldom bring legal liability, because few such 
associations have any significant share of the markets in which they hire 
employees, buy supplies, rent offices, invest funds, or sell services to the public.  
Even in the presence of power, most such decisions are “reasonable” as far as 
antitrust is concerned, and thus lawful.  Nevertheless, all of these decisions 
                                                 
* Ben v. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa. 
1 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1511170
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become subject to Sherman Act §1 litigation if they are conspiracies. General 
allegations of nontrivial market shares within the very narrow markets that are 
often alleged would be sufficient to survive a dismissal or even a summary 
judgment motion before discovery. One might respond to this concern in three 
ways: ignore it, adjust the necessary allegations or proofs, or hold such 
organizations to be continuing conspiracies for some purposes but single entities 
for other purposes. 
 
Although it lacks precise meaning or antitrust consequence, “joint venture” 
usually refers to a research, production, or marketing enterprise created by 
several persons other than ordinary investors. The creators may be actual 
competitors, potential competitors, potential buyer and seller, or otherwise in 
“related” businesses. Obviously, the most significant competitive threats arise 
when joint venture participants are actual or potential competitors.  A venture's 
formation results from the founders' “agreement,” which, like any other formation 
agreement, can be appraised for “reasonableness” under Sherman Act §1. Such 
an agreement among competitors may typically threaten competition more than 
the presumptively lawful agreement among ordinary investors creating the usual 
business firm and therefore invites more careful scrutiny.2 
A joint venture also resembles the more loose-knit trade association of 
competitors or the even looser-knit simple contract among competitors. Yet it 
differs from both. Unlike the restraining contract, the venture agreement may not 
directly limit the future behavior of the founders. Unlike the trade association, 
whose main activities affect the members' competition among themselves, the 
main activity of the typical joint venture is research, production, or distribution in 
its own right. The latter distinction is not a sharp one because a trade association 
may also do research and produce information, and a joint venture may also limit 
or affect its parents' marketing behavior. Nonetheless, worth emphasizing is the 
joint venture's market role, which may be both separate from that of its parents 
and more like that of the ordinary firm. 
The issue considered here is when should such ventures be regarded as a 
single entity for antitrust purposes and when as a continuing conspiracy among 
their creators or members. The “single entity” answer seems appropriate for 
venture activities not governing the members' conduct, while the “continuing 
conspiracy” answer seems wise for rule-making activities and for those 
developments that could make continued collaboration unreasonable for the 
future. The latter conclusion may be qualified for ventures that ought to be 
regarded as “quasimergers” and left undisturbed. 
Antitrust challenges to trade association activities generally seek to enjoin a 
particular practice and rarely challenge the association's very existence. While 
this is generally true for joint ventures, the conclusion is less categorical. Some 
“joint ventures” are in fact little more than fronts for cartels and, having no lawful 
                                                 
2See 12 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law  ¶2101 (2d ed. 2005). 
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purpose, are properly dissolved by antitrust decree.3 Other joint ventures 
integrate the participants so completely that they are analyzed in the same way 
as mergers and can thus be enjoined under merger standards of illegality.4 
Formation and Future Reexamination of the Joint Venture 
Competitors are permitted to collaborate when the threats to competition are 
either modest or are outweighed by pro competitive considerations. Although 
usually made case by case, this appraisal is sometimes made for a class, as in 
the per se condemnation of naked price fixing, which is thought to lack 
redeeming virtue and to endanger competition severely because it is undertaken 
only by those who assume they can control the market.5 But even the per se 
categories have exceptions, and what may seem like “price fixing” to the 
layperson will not always be so classified by the courts.6 For example, suppose 
that firms A and B jointly create firm C to market the one product they make; C 
sets the price it charges for the product, draws equally on A and B for supplies 
(up to the point of the ability of each to produce) and returns its net revenues to A 
and B in proportion to the amounts each supplied. Although A and B have thus 
ended price competition inter se, the arrangement is not regarded as a price-
fixing conspiracy—or at least not the kind of price fixing that is automatically 
unlawful. The A-B agreement that creates C will be held reasonable when it 
brings significant cost savings to collaborators with relatively modest market 
shares.7 Unlike a naked price-fixing agreement between those very same firms, 
the joint selling agreement can achieve the parties' apparent objective—here, 
socially desirable cost savings—without implying that the collaborators possess 
market power. 
The courts examine not only the immediate harms and benefits of a venture, 
but also the likely consequences of all that is reasonably necessary to carry it 
out, the expected ways in which the venture will act vis-à-vis its parents and their 
competitors, and the probable spillovers on the parents' other activities. Thus, a 
well-considered decision legalizing the creation of a joint venture necessarily 
expresses approval of all that is inherent and reasonably ancillary to it. Because 
it would be senseless for antitrust law to take away with one hand what it gives 
with the other, approval means that the subsequent realization of that which was 
foreseeable and judged reasonable at the time of creation must also be legal. 
Of course, even if we assume a fully litigated and careful judgment, the 
original appraisal may be wrong. Or the inherent aspects of the venture or its 
spillovers may turn out worse than we once reasonably supposed. Or the parties 
may behave more restrictively than originally seemed likely. In those events, the 
                                                 
3This was the Supreme Court's characterization of the railroad joint ventures 
dissolved in United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U.S. 290 (1897); and 
United States v. Joint-Traffic Assn., 171 U.S. 505 (1898). 
4See 12 Antitrust Law ¶¶2121c,  2122 
5See 7 Antitrust Law ¶¶1509, 1510, 11 Antitrust Law ¶1910. 
6E.g., Broadcast Music v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979). 
7See 12 Antitrust Law ¶¶2132, 2137. 
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original formation may later be judged illegal. 
To be sure, an argument can be made that a lawful productive venture should 
be regarded as a partial or quasi-merger among the parents.8 Although the 
legality of the original formation will often be examined later, actual litigation and 
approval operates as a “legal license.”9 At least some of the reasons for leaving a 
merger undisturbed by subsequent developments apply to the joint venture as 
well. Furthermore, exposing such ventures to the peril of later developments may 
encourage total merger at the outset even though the parties are content with 
less than total and more competitive partial integration. An added value of the 
joint venture is that the parents generally remain as important and independent 
market actors, often in competition with one another with respect to nonventure 
business. 
In any event, under appropriate circumstances, antitrust has the power both 
to condemn the original formation and to supervise ongoing activities. For 
example, suppose that two integrated oil companies—each one of which 
explores, produces, transports, refines, and markets—form a separate company 
that bids against others for certain exploration rights. The company acquires the 
rights, drills successfully, and either delivers the resulting oil to its parents or sells 
it to outsiders. Competition among the parents in bidding has been eliminated 
through an undoubted agreement, which we will assume to be lawful on a finding 
that threats to competition are minor or outweighed by risk-sharing virtues. Post-
exploration effects on the parents' own competitive production decisions will be 
considered. For example, parental discussions about the venture's output or 
price might lead to similar decisions by each parent. If this danger seems 
unacceptable because of the parents' own market shares, the venture will be 
deemed unlawful at the outset, unless those spillovers can be eliminated by 
insulating venture decisions from the parents or by providing for operation by 
only one parent or by requiring that successful wells must be sold back to one 
parent or the other. And if not made at the outset, such judgments can be made 
later. Thus, competition can be fully protected without regarding the venture's 
own decisions as a conspiracy of the parents. Unacceptable spillovers on the 
parents' competition with each other can be seen as an aspect of the agreement 
creating the venture and, if not avoidable by altering venture mechanics, could 
justify dissolution of the venture as unlawful collaboration among the parents. 
A similar question might arise in a joint research venture. Initial permission 
under the antitrust laws would normally reflect a judgment that the parents face 
enough competition from others to motivate continued research notwithstanding 
the end of research competition inter se. So long as that situation continues, 
there is no reason to ask whether the venture has purposely slowed the pace of 
development. But if the parents come to dominate the industry such that their 
                                                 
8E.g., United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964), which subjected 
the formation of a joint venture company to Clayton Act §7. 
9See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 343 (D. Mass. 
1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). 
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venture now amounts to industrywide collaboration, the venture itself may have 
become unreasonable. They may no longer need the venture in order to perform 
efficient research. Moreover, the venture no longer has the spur of outside 
competition to motivate “adequate” innovation. Apart from selfincrimination by the 
collaborators, however, it will seldom be possible to compare actual innovation 
with what might have been. But if the venture is not regarded as a permanent 
quasi-merger subject only to Sherman Act §2,and if a remedy is otherwise 
appropriate, the proper course is dissolution rather than close judicial supervision 
of joint research operations as a “continuing conspiracy.” 
 
Impact on Competitors of Parents 
Suppose that two small firms create a joint research venture that invents the 
“better mousetrap” but licenses only its parents, who thereby win the market. 
Here we must be very discriminating about what, if anything, should be brought 
to an end. Further joint research by these collaborators may become 
inappropriate but not their retention of the fruits of past lawful joint research. The 
appropriate result for the future is a very different question from the disposition of 
the invention. 
The reason is clear: the original collaboration was permitted in order to 
encourage research. Research is encouraged by the prospect of success for 
those who risk it. The procompetitive objective would be impaired by denying risk 
bearers the fruits of their venture. The argument is not ironclad. We might 
conceptualize the venture firm as the separate entity we argue for in other 
contexts and view the parents as mere investors who can profit when the venture 
sells its invention to all comers. But the fact is that it was not general investors 
who created the venture—and nothing prevented rivals or general investors from 
undertaking similar risks. Of course, if this policy conclusion is sound, it matters 
not how we conceptualize the transaction for conspiracy purposes. An 
agreement at the outset between two small firms that they would keep the fruits 
of the venture to themselves seems as reasonable as the venture itself. Even 
without such express agreement, exclusive self-use seems entirely foreseeable. 
Again, therefore, it is not the refusal to license others that is anticompetitive. At 
most, it is continued collaboration through the joint venture that should be ended. 
In Rothery the District of Columbia Circuit was faced with a national van line 
and storage firm, Atlas, that engaged independent firms to solicit customers and 
pack and carry goods.11 Atlas had certain rules, such as forbidding each affiliated 
carrier from moving goods for which Atlas received no compensation(except 
through a separate firm not associated in customers' minds with Atlas). Some of 
those carriers wished to challenge the limitation as an illegal “boycott,” which 
required finding an agreement. The Atlas board's 11 members included six actual 
or potential carriers and three officers of Atlas: 
                                                 
11Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 1033(1987). 
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Thus, all but two members of the board represented 
separate legal entities that competed in interstate 
commerce. This brings the case within the rule of Sealy and 
Topco and shows the existence of a horizontal restraint.12 
In the cited cases the central rule-making organization was wholly owned and 
controlled by the members, who were thus making rules for themselves that 
affected their nonventure business. The Rothery court emphasized that the firms 
actually carrying the goods competed with each other and in part with Atlas, and 
that the rules governing their association, though formally promulgated by Atlas, 
reflected an understanding among the constituent parts, which remained 
independent forces in the market to which the Atlas rules applied. This 
conclusion seems correct even though the affiliated firms did not own Atlas or 
entirely control it. 
Contrast the Greensboro decision, where some 39 rural electric distribution 
cooperatives created Oglethorpe, a nonprofit electric generation and 
transmission cooperative, which they owned and whose policies and rates they 
dictated.13 In order to meet their needs and in accordance with various federal 
policies relating to the financing of rural electrification, the parent cooperatives 
agreed to purchase most of their energy needs from Oglethorpe.14 When these 
purchasing arrangements were challenged by a would-be seller of power to the 
distribution co-ops, the court held that they and Oglethorpe constituted a single 
entity and thus were incapable of conspiring under the Sherman Act.15 While the 
decision of individual members to purchase most of their needs from a commonly 
owned entity was almost certainly reasonable, we would not have removed it 
from §1 scrutiny by declaring it to be unilateral, for it affected the individual 
purchasing decisions of the members.16 
In Hahn the Ninth Circuit thought it relevant to decide whether a health 
insurance plan should be regarded as a conspiracy of its board members (or 
perhaps of physicians participating in the plan).17 Podiatrists complained that 
                                                 
12Id. at 215, citing United States v. Sealy Corp., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); Topco Assocs. 
v. United States, 405 U.S. 596 (1972). 
13Greensboro Lumber Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 643 F. Supp. 1345, 1352 (N.D. 
Ga.1986). 
14Id. at 1353. 
15Id. At 1367. See also Genetic Sys. Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories, 691 F. Supp. 407, 
(D.D.C. 1988) (not-for-profit National Red Cross corporation incapable of conspiring with 
its unincorporated branches, or “regions”). 
16By contrast, the decision in City of Mt. Pleasant v. Associated Elec. Co-op, 838 
F.2d 268 (8th Cir. 1988), involved the venture's own pricing of its output. Cf. Sewell 
Plastics v. Coca-Cola, 720 F. Supp. 1196 (W.D.N.C. 1989), aff'd per curiam, 1990-2 
Trade Cas. ¶69,165, 912 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1990, unpublished), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 
1110 (1991) (soft drink bottlers built their own bottle-manufacturing facility and agreed to 
purchase a minimum specified percentage of their bottle needs from it). 
17Hahn v. Oregon Physicians' Serv., 868 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 
U.S. 846 (1989). 
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they were forbidden “membership” and, although they were reimbursed by the 
plan, they were reimbursed at lower rates than were physicians who treated the 
foot. If competing physicians controlled the plan, the court thought they could be 
engaged in an illegal boycott of the podiatrists. The Ninth Circuit saw the issue as 
whether practitioners sharing substantially similar economic 
interests collectively exercised control of a plan under whose 
auspices they have reached an agreement which works to 
the detriment of competitors.18 
The court apparently thought they did because 90 percent of the board 
members were practicing physicians at a time when the board limited the 
reimbursement rate of the complaining podiatrists and because physicians 
generally perform considerable foot care, though that was not their primary 
source of income. Even physician board members not doing feet were deemed to 
have an economic interest aligned with physicians who did. 
 
Once a venture is judged to have been lawful at its inception and currently, 
decisions that do not affect the behavior of the participants in their nonventure 
business should generally be regarded as those of a single entity rather than the 
parents' daily conspiracy. This rule saves the parties and the courts from 
inconvenient, if not impossible, judicial review of the venture's day-to-day 
operations at the suit of disappointed suppliers and others and, as we have just 
seen, does not immunize any seriously anticompetitive conduct resulting from 
unexpected spillovers or relevant changes in market circumstances. 
Organizations such as the New York Stock Exchange and the Associated 
Press were properly treated as continuing conspiracies of their members to the 
extent that they made rules for the admission of members' competitors or for the 
control of the members' nonventure business. But such organizations also do 
other things. The New York Stock Exchange buys Wall Street property for its 
offices and contracts with certain manufacturers for the installation of stock 
quotation computers. The Associated Press buys and rents typewriters and hires 
reporters and analysts. A joint research venture hires scientists and may be one 
of the few purchasers of exotic equipment. 
Such decisions are seldom attacked under Sherman Act §1, probably 
because they seem reasonable even if viewed as conspiracies among the 
members—either because the members lack significant market power in the 
machine-realty-employee markets or because such collaboration is reasonably 
inherent in the permitted concert creating the central organization. Occasionally, 
an unsuccessful effort is made to characterize venture behavior as a per se 
illegal “boycott” conspiracy. Suppose, for example, that the Associated Press 
decides to hire only college graduates in its own offices. Though perhaps unwise, 
such a decision by an individual newspaper would not be of antitrust concern, 
while a collective decision by several newspapers would be. Let us suppose that 
                                                 
18Id. at 1029. 
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each individual newspaper continues to decide its own hiring policies unilaterally. 
Upon a challenge by a would-be employee, the Associated Press should be 
treated as a single entity, although admittedly one that is controlled by its 
members. Once we allow the several newspapers to create the Associated Press 
to gather news, that function will be performed most efficiently by an organization 
that can operate with the same legal freedoms as the ordinary business entity. 
Furthermore, it would be socially inconvenient to treat it as a conspiracy whose 
every act is subject to judicial supervision. 
To test that single-entity approach, suppose that the Associated Press were a 
virtual monopsony19 in the market for certain specialized analysts. The judicial 
temptation to control a monopsonist's “unfair” conduct may grab the §1 handle 
provided by the agreement creating the AP; it would be as if the founders had 
specified that their creature would only hire certain persons. Literacy, knowledge, 
and sophistication are reasonable objectives, the plaintiffs will say, but the 
exclusion of nongraduates is overbroad. Unfortunately, the openness and 
ambiguity of “reasonableness” seemingly invites courts either to substitute their 
managerial judgments for those of the firm or, as is often demanded of 
administrative agencies, to require hearings and other “due process” for affected 
persons. However, the parentage of the Associated Press does not suggest that 
its management is likely to be less wise or less competitive in the employment 
market than an AP-like organization created by ordinary investors. Given that we 
will not dissolve such a useful joint enterprise, we should see its operation as that 
of a single entity. And if it attains or threatens monopoly power, it will be subject 
to the same §2 control as other firms with such power.20 
                                                 
19A monopsonist is a monopolist in the market in which it buys. See 2B Phillip E. 
Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶574 (3d ed. 2008).. 
20   See Bell v. Fur Breeders' Agricultural Cooperative, 348 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 
2003), which concluded that an agricultural cooperative owned by fur breeders is a 
single entity for purposes of a member's complaint that discriminatory policies under 
which cooperative delivered feed to its members constituted an antitrust violation. The 
court relied on language in Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Products 
Co., 370 U.S. 19 (1962), treating three corporations that formed into an agricultural 
cooperative as a single entity, and concluding that the Supreme Court had determined 
that agricultural cooperatives, like corporations, do not have the plurality of actors 
necessary for a Section 1“conspiracy.” 348 F.3d at 1232-1233. However, numerous 
cases have refused to apply the Capper-Volstead exemption and have found a §1 
conspiracy when an agricultural cooperative engages in acts of “boycott” or “intimidation” 
as opposed to mere price fixing. See, e.g., United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 
(1939) (finding §1 conspiracy). 
See also American Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 538 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 
2009 Wl 1835175 (US Jun. 9, 2009) (for purposes of exclusive licensing agreement to a 
single apparel manufacturer the NFL should be considered a single entity; and a firm 
may license either one or multiple licensees at its pleasure); Jack Russell Terrier 
Network of Northern Cal. v. American Kennel Club, Inc., 407 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2005), 
holding that, consistent with the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint, a nonprofit 
association made up of dog breeders (the JRTCA, or Jack Russell Terrier Club of 
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America), many of whom are for-profit entities, should be treated as a single entity: 
Assuming all the Appellants' alleged facts to be true, they have not 
alleged sufficient facts to support a claim that the JRTCA and its 
affiliates are separate entities pursuing different economic goals, 
capable of conspiring for Sherman Act purposes. First, regarding 
the parties' unity of economic interest, the Appellants did not 
allege in what manner the JRTCA and the JRTCA regional 
affiliates named as co-defendants had divergent economic 
interests, or what goals the affiliates pursued other than those of 
the JRTCA. 
Id. at 1036, and noting: 
We have held that the single entity rule applies to principal-agent 
relationships, Calculators Hawaii, Inc. v. Brandt, Inc., 724 F.2d 
1332, 1336 (9th Cir. 1983), as well as to an agreement between a 
franchiser and franchisee, Williams v. I.B. Fischer Nevada, 999 
F.2d 445, 447-48 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). See alsoLevi Case 
Co., Inc. v. ATS Prods. Inc., 788 F. Supp. 428, 431-32 (N.D. Cal. 
1992) (holding that a patent holder was legally incapable of 
conspiring with the patent licensee). 
Id. at 1034. See also Ultrasound Imaging Corp. v. The American Society of Breast 
Surgeons, 358 F. Supp. 2d 475 (D. Md. 2005) (nonprofit surgical association's decision 
not to permit plaintiff to exhibit its merchandise at defendant's annual conference was a 
unilateral act)..  See also Webster County Memorial Hospital v. United Mine Workers of 
America Welfare & Retirement Fund, 536 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1976). A labor union 
welfare fund provided health care for its members through contracts with hospitals and 
other providers of health care. The union ceased patronizing the plaintiff hospital 
pending resolution of a fee dispute. The hospital alleged a “boycott” conspiracy. Without 
characterizing the union as a single entity or the members as conspirators, the court 
held only that a conspiracy, if any, was not of the per se kind. 
On the other side, see  Freeman v. San Diego Assn. of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133, 
1144-1146 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 940 (2003) (mere fact that different real 
estate associations were engaged in production of a common MLS database did not 
render them a single entity with respect to claim that they fixed the price of individually 
provided support services for that database); National Hockey League Players Assn. v. 
Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 419 F.3d 462 (6th Cir. 2005) (NHL was composed of 
multiple teams and thus had conspiratorial capacity for purposes of its agreed-upon 
adoption of eligibility rules); American Needle, Inc. v. New Orleans Louisiana Saints, 496 
F. Supp. 2d 941 (N.D. Ill. 2007), aff’d, 338 F. 3d 736(7th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 2009 
WL 1835175 (US Jun. 29, 2009) (NFL should be considered a single entity for purposes 
of claim that their jointly owned licensing affiliate granted an exclusive trademark license 
to a rival clothing manufacturer; following Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership 
v. National Basketball Assoc., 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996)); Visa USA, Inc. v. First Data 
Corp., 2005-2 Trade Cas. ¶74,968 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2005) (with respect to its network 
operating rules the Visa joint venture was not a single entity but rather a combination 
composed of its individual bank members; noting that the members did not have 
common ownership, were not fiduciaries of one another, did not share profits and losses, 
and had many divergent economic interests; further, they competed with each other in 
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Professional Sports Leagues 
Leagues of professional sports teams have faced considerable antitrust 
litigation over various (1) ethical rules governing players, (2) hiring rules affecting 
player eligibility for employment and competition among the teams for players,(3) 
rules governing team location and other team management decisions, and(4) 
rules governing a team owner's relation to other sports. Many league rules might 
be characterized as “boycotts,” which are often said to be unlawful per se. 
Because it seems so obvious that such rules ought not to be condemned 
automatically—and they have not been—some courts and commentators sought 
to escape the per se claim by characterizing the league as a single entity.  Many 
but not all courts have mainly rejected both the single entity and the per se 
claims, finding conspiracies and often condemning particular league rules as 
unreasonable. 
In the Soccer case, for example, the Second Circuit considered a National 
Football League (NFL) rule forbidding owners of member teams from investing in 
other professional sports.21 The court reversed the district judge's holding that 
“§1 does not apply for the reason that the NFL acted as a ‘single economic entity’ 
and not as a combination or conspiracy….”22 The Second Circuit relied on the 
Supreme Court's Timken language stating that creating a joint venture does not 
eliminate a conspiracy among the creators.23 To rule otherwise would, the Soccer 
case declared, create 
[a] loophole [that] would permit league members to escape 
antitrust responsibility for any restraint entered into by them 
that would benefit their league or enhance their ability to 
compete even though the benefit would be outweighed by its 
anticompetitive effects.24 
The quoted policy rationale might seem to beg the question, for 
anticompetitive effects resulting from unilateral action are not governed by 
Sherman Act §1. Nevertheless, that section should govern the league rule in 
dispute because Sherman Act §1 purported to control the behavior of team 
owners as independent actors in the investment market. The court suggested as 
much by analogizing the NFL's agreement with member teams to agreements 
between manufacturing firms and unrelated distributing firms, which the Sherman 
Act clearly covers. A better analysis would focus directly on the restraint on 
investors. We saw earlier that §1 applies to an agreement between an ordinary 
                                                                                                                                                 
many markets). 
21North American Soccer League v. National Football League (Soccer), 670 F.2d 
1249 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982). Accord Volvo N. Am. Corp. v. Men's 
Intl. Prof. Tennis Council, 857 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1988) (tennis association decisions 
represented conspiracy of members). 
22Soccer, 670 F. 2d at 1256. 
23On the Timken decision, see 7 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust 
Law  ¶1463d (3d ed. 2010) (in press). 
24670 F.2d at 1257. 
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corporation and its shareholders in limiting their other investments.25 
In this respect, as in player eligibility and hiring practices, the member teams 
remain significant economic actors. Not only is each an economic entity whose 
ownership interests are unrelated to those of other teams, but each generates its 
own profits (or losses), selects its own management, hires and fires, arranges its 
own home playing site, and the like. To be sure, some joint activity is essential to 
the operation of professional sports: game rules, schedules, playoff rules, 
revenue divisions among teams, and perhaps television rights and revenue 
allocations. The league thus has a dual personality. Like the New York Stock 
Exchange, it is an entity in its own right in some respects, but it also makes rules 
for its members' own marketplace behavior. 
It may be helpful to compare a different structure. Imagine that investors 
create a new Hypothetical Football League (HFL); that the league is the only 
business entity involved; that it hires and fires and designates certain divisions to 
which it assigns and reassigns players and managers; that it decides how many 
teams to have, where to locate them, and when to move them; that it contracts 
with cities, stadiums, broadcasters, and so forth; and that it receives all the 
revenues, decides what to retain, and distributes the remainder to shareholders. 
The HFL would not be immune from Sherman Act §2. But apart from agreements 
limiting the opportunities of its investors, players, broadcasters, and so forth to 
deal with a rival league, the HFL would escape §1 in deciding to “boycott” 
teenagers, one-eyed players, or students still in college; to set salaries and 
assign or reassign players among its divisions; or to add, subtract, or relocate 
playing divisions. The courts have generally so held in the relatively few 
decisions involving sports league teams that are not individually owned but are 
the property of the league itself.26 
But why should antitrust courts largely ignore the HFL while involving 
themselves so deeply in the affairs of the actual sports leagues? Are the HFL 
and the NFL so different? Perhaps it is enough to be grateful that professional 
sports have not been organized in the HFL way, which creates so much 
uncorrected power. Here, as elsewhere, we take industrial organization as we 
find it, and here we find entities with separate market significance, albeit entities 
that need more collaboration than we tolerate for ordinary business firms. 
The courts have largely understood that sports leagues lie in between 
ordinary business firms, whose collaboration is suspect, and totally integrated 
enterprises subject only to §2. They have also understood that these situations 
need “in-between” substantive antitrust rules. They certainly, and correctly, have 
not woodenly applied the per se prohibitions developed for ordinary business 
                                                 
25See 7 Antitrust Law ¶1476a. 
26E.g., Eleven Line v. North Texas State Soccer Assn., 213 F.3d 198, 205 (5th Cir. 
2000), appeal after remand, 251 F. 3d 157 (5th  Cir. 2001) (precluding conspiracy claim 
among the players and coaches of a not-for-profit soccer league whose teams were 
simply organized by the league itself, and not “owned” by any distinct entities). But see 
the discussion of the First Circuit's important Fraser decision, infra at notes 36-42. 
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situations. But comprehensible guides to “reasonableness” have not yet 
emerged. The inherent openness of that term often leads judges and juries to 
venture beyond competition and into management discretion. The line between 
them has remained elusive for all of us. 
In sum, the rules of a sports league should be regarded as “conspiratorial” 
when they affect the conduct of individual participants in their nonventure 
business but as unilateral when they have no such effect. For example, the NFL's 
decision to have a schedule consisting of 12 one-hour games per year is clearly 
an “output limitation,” because it could have more or longer games, but it is also 
an essentially unilateral act because it affects nothing but the output of the NFL 
as an entity. By contrast, a rule stating that the NFL schedule consists of 12 
games and that the individual team owners are forbidden from organizing 
additional games among NFL teams or between NFL and non-NFL teams should 
be regarded as collaborative, because it affects the individual members' 
nonventure conduct. Of course, such a rule might be “reasonable,” and thus 
lawful, but it is not unilateral. 
In Chicago Professional Sports the Seventh Circuit ultimately decided that, 
notwithstanding superficial similarities to the NCAA,27 the NBA was more like a 
single entity than a cartel of independent teams.28 The district court had held that 
the NBA cannot be a single entity unless there was a “complete unity of 
interest,”29 which the individual teams did not have because each was a 
separately owned profit-making entity. The NBA argued that it was an 
incorporated entity and that it should be treated as a corporate board, with the 
teams treated as the corporation's subsidiaries. Of course, this relationship is not 
the same as the parent-subsidiary relationship, for the teams are not commonly 
owned by their “parent.” Nevertheless, it does produce a single product—namely, 
NBA basketball. 
The Seventh Circuit concluded: 
Copperweld…asks why the antitrust laws distinguish 
between unilateral and concerted action, and then assigns a 
parent-subsidiary group to the “unilateral” side in light of 
those functions. Like a single firm, the parent-subsidiary 
combination cooperates internally to increase efficiency. 
Conduct that “deprives the marketplace of the independent 
centers of decision-making that competition assumes,” 
[Copperweld,] 467 U.S. at 769, without the efficiencies that 
come with integration inside a firm, go on the “concerted” 
side of the line. And there are entities in the middle: 
“mergers, joint ventures, and various vertical agreements” 
                                                 
27National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
28Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996).  
See also See also American Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 538 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. 
granted, 2009 Wl 1835175 (US Jun. 9, 2009). 
29See id. at 597; and 874 F. Supp. 844 (N.D. Ill. 1995). 
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(id. at 768) that reduce the number of independent decision 
makers yet may improve efficiency. These are assessed 
under the Rule of Reason. We see no reason why a sports 
league cannot be treated as a single firm in this typology. It 
produces a single product; cooperation is essential (a league 
with one team would be like one hand clapping); and a 
league need not deprive the market of independent centers 
of decision making.30 
While all of this would seem to apply equally to the NCAA case, where the 
court found an agreement of separate colleges and their football teams, the 
Seventh Circuit found this distinction: 
[T]he NBA has no existence independent of sports. It makes 
professional basketball; only it can make “NBA Basketball” 
games; and unlike the NCAA the NBA also “makes” 
teams…. [T]he NBA created new teams in Toronto and 
Vancouver, stocked with players from the 27 existing teams 
plus an extra helping of draft choices. All of this makes the 
league look like a single firm. Yet the 29 clubs, unlike GM's 
plants, have the right to secede…and rearrange into two or 
three leagues. Professional sports leagues have been 
assembled from clubs that formerly belonged to other 
leagues…. Moreover, the league looks more or less like a 
firm depending on which facet of the business one 
examines. From the perspective of fans and advertisers 
(who use sports telecasts to reach fans), “NBA Basketball” is 
one product from a single source…, just as General Motors 
is a single firm even though a Corvette differs from a 
Chevrolet. But from the perspective of college basketball 
players who seek to sell their skills, the teams are 
distinct….32 
The Seventh Circuit would thus extend Copperweld to situations where a 
second corporation is separately owned but was created by the first 
corporation—at least for some purposes. The colleges in NCAA were 
unquestionably separate entities with significant functions outside of the NCAA, 
thus justifying their treatment as distinct. By contrast, a professional sports team 
typically has no other function than the provision of professional sports and, as 
                                                 
30Chicago Professional Sports, 95 F.3d at 598-599. 
3295 F.3d at 599. The court also likened the NBA to a franchise system, whose many 
business decisions are undertaken for the group as a whole; for example, we would not 
expect to see one McDonald's franchise compete with the others by offering pizza. Id. at 
598. Of course, an important difference in the franchise setting is that the relevant 
agreement is presumably a vertical one between the franchiser and each franchisee 
separately. Antitrust would certainly look quite closely at a horizontal agreement among 
a group of restaurants that none would sell pizza, even if the restaurants shared certain 
intellectual property such as a common name. 
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the court pointed out, the creation of many of the separate teams is actually 
instigated by the parent organization.33 
The point can be pushed too far. Many firms spun off from other firms 
subsequently become competitors and are quite clearly capable of collusion. The 
important additional point in the NBA situation is that not only were the individual 
teams created by the organization, they were also created exclusively for the 
purpose of supplying professional basketball within the ongoing, network-style 
NBA joint venture. 
But suppose that at some later time, after relaxation of NBA rules limiting 
collateral activities, two or more of these NBA teams individually entered into the 
manufacture of sporting goods such as basketballs. The Seventh Circuit's 
rationale would not protect a subsequent price-fixing agreement in basketballs, 
because the teams were not created for that purpose and would thus have to be 
regarded as distinct entities. Further, basketball production differs from 
basketball game production in that the former does not require an ongoing 
network joint venture. The Chicago Professional Sports rule must be limited to 
activities for which the joint venture is reasonably necessary.34 
The Seventh Circuit's approach seems to understate the relevance of 
concerted activity in a rule of reason case. Once the tribunal has concluded that 
the NBA is a single entity, then its output limitation (unaccompanied by any 
exclusionary practice directed at others) must be considered legal per se and not 
subjected to the rule of reason.35 We would prefer to focus on the particular rule 
under antitrust scrutiny. If it affected the individual teams' nonventure conduct it 
should be regarded as collaborative; if it did not, then it should be considered 
unilateral. 
 The American Needle decision, currently before the Supreme Court, 
                                                 
33See also NFL v. North Am. Soccer League, 459 U.S. 1074, 1077 (1982) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting from certiorari denial, arguing that NFL should be treated as 
single entity); Seabury Management v. PGA of Am., 878 F. Supp. 771 (D. Md. 1994), 
aff'd in relevant part, 52F.3d 322 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 867 (1995) 
(treating PGA as single entity). 
34Thus, the court issued this warning: 
Sports are sufficiently diverse that it is essential to investigate their 
organization and ask Copperweld's functional question one league 
at a time—and perhaps one facet of a league at a time, for we do 
not rule out the possibility that an organization such as the NBA is 
best understood as one firm when selling broadcast rights to a 
network in competition with a thousand other producers of 
entertainment, but is best understood as a joint venture when 
curtailing competition for players who have few other market 
opportunities. 
95 F.3d at 600. 
35See 3A Phillip E. Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp Antitrust Law ¶720 (3d ed. 
2008). 
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involves the NFL’s exclusive license agreement, not of the NFL’s own 
independent intellectual property, but rather of the intellectual property of the 
individual teams.  The NFL had acquired an exclusive right from the individual 
teams to license these rights, mainly in trademarked symbols that were placed 
on clothing, helmets and hats (headware) sold for consumer use, and other 
goods bearing the trademarks of the individual NFL teams.  The NFL then in turn 
granted an exclusive license to Rebook for headware, thus making it impossible 
for the plaintiff American Needle to acquire such rights.2 
In this case the individual team members were giving up their individual right 
to license their trademarked symbols individually, and competitively, in favor of 
the NFL’s exclusive license.  The ancillary restraints doctrine is an inherently 
better vehicle for assessing such claims, and characterization of the conduct as 
“unilateral” largely preclude such analysis.  The NFL has legitimate interests in 
managing the NFL schedule and game rules, regulations, contracts that 
inherently involve two or more member teams, such as broadcasting 
agreements, and the like.  With respect to individually held trademarks it may 
also have an interest in the manner in which they are licensed – for example, if 
they are licensed by an individual team for use on articles that are offensive or 
that denigrate the NFL or tarnish its image.  Whether it should have the authority 
to eliminate all inter-team competition in trademark licensing is a different issue, 
and one which the doctrine of ancillary joint venture restraints is designed to 
address.  By contrast, to the extent that the NFL developed its own trademarks, 
held by and representing the NFL as an organization, no team individually could 
individually license that right and an exclusive license granting reproduction 
rights to another would have to be counted as a unilateral act.  By the same 
token, if the issue were labor negotiations the NFL would be a single entity with 
respect to its own employees, namely those of the NFL itself; but it would be and 
has been considered to be a collaboration of multiple employers with respect to 
the employees, including players, of its individual teams.3 
In sharp contrast to Chicago Professional Sports, dicta in the First Circuit's 
Fraser decision found conspiratorial capacity notwithstanding common 
ownership.36 Defendant Major League Soccer (MLS) is the only professional 
soccer league in the United States sanctioned for World Cup play. MLS is itself 
owned by a number of independent investors, and it owns all of the 12 
participating teams. Some of the investors are passive; others are active as 
individual team “managers.” The court described the role of these investor 
managers: 
MLS contracts with these investors to operate nine of the 
league's teams .the league runs the other three). These 
                                                 
2 American Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 538 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 2009 Wl 
1835175 (US Jun. 9, 2009). 
3 Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 249 (1996). 
36Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 284 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 US 
885 (2002). 
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investors are referred to as operator/investors and are the 
co-defendants in this action. Each operator/investor has the 
“exclusive right and obligation to provide Management 
Services for a Team within its Home Territory” and is given 
some leeway in running the team and reaping the potential 
benefits therefrom. 
Specifically, the operator/investors hire, at their own 
expense and discretion, local staff(including the general 
managers and coaches of their respective teams), and are 
responsible for local office expenses, local promotional costs 
for home games, and one-half the stadium rent (the same 
portion as MLS). In addition, they license local broadcast 
rights, sell home tickets, and conduct all local marketing on 
behalf of MLS; agreements regarding these matters do not 
require the prior approval of MLS. And they control a 
majority of the seats on MLS's board, the very same body 
which runs the league's operations. Among other things, the 
board is responsible for hiring the commissioner and 
approving national television contracts and marketing 
decisions, league rules and policies(including team player 
budgets), and sales of interests. 
The operator/investors also play a limited role in selecting 
players for their respective teams. While the operating 
agreements provide that the operator/investors will not bid 
independently for players against MLS, they may trade 
players with other MLS teams and select players in the 
league's draft. Such transactions, however, must follow strict 
rules established by the league. Most importantly, no team 
may exceed the maximum player budget established by the 
management committee. 
In return for the services of the operator/investors, MLS 
pays each of them a “management fee” that corresponds (in 
large part) to the performance of their respective team…. 
… Although the league retains legal title to the teams, the 
operator/investors may transfer their operating rights, within 
certain limits, and retain much of the value created by their 
individual efforts and investments. Investors may transfer 
their ownership stakes and operating rights to other current 
investors without obtaining prior consent; transfers to outside 
investors, however, require a two-thirds majority vote of the 
board.37 
The First Circuit concluded that on these facts MLS should be considered a 
                                                 
37Id. at 54. 
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group of separate teams capable of conspiring, rather than a single entity. The 
court acknowledged that in a more straightforward situation, where a league 
owned and centrally managed all the teams, a single-entity conclusion would be 
mandated.38 However, 
The challenge here is primarily to the operator/investors' role 
as team managers, not as ordinary stockholders, and to 
restrictions imposed on them in that role preventing 
competition for player services. That a stockholder may be 
insulated by Copperweld when making ordinary governance 
decisions does not mean automatic protection when the 
stockholder is also an entrepreneur separately contracting 
with the company. Above all, there are functional differences 
between this case and Copperweld that are significant for 
antitrust policy…. 
… MLS and its operator/investors have separate 
contractual relationships giving the operator/investors rights 
that take them part way along the path to ordinary sports 
team owners: they do some independent hiring and make 
out-of-pocket investments in their own teams; they retain a 
large portion of the revenues from the activities of their 
teams; and each has limited sale rights in its own team that 
relate to specific assets and not just shares in the common 
enterprise.39 
Further, 
in this case the analogy to a single entity is weakened, and 
the resemblance to a collaborative venture strengthened, by 
the fact that the operator/investors are not mere servants of 
MLS; effectively, they control it, having the majority of votes 
on the managing board. The problem is especially serious 
where, as here, the stockholders are themselves potential 
competitors with MLS and with each other. Here, it is MLS 
that has two roles: one as an entrepreneur with its own 
assets and revenues; the other (arguably) as a nominally 
vertical device for producing horizontal coordination, i.e., 
limiting competition among operator/investors.40 
Thus, the court described the situation as similar to the one in Sealy,41 in 
which the Sealy joint venture's name and intellectual property were owned by 
                                                 
38Cf. Eleven Line v. North Texas State Soccer Assn., 213 F.3d 198, 205 (5th Cir. 
2000), appeal after remand, 251 F. 3d 157 (5th  Cir. 2001). 
39Fraser, 284 F.3d at 57. 
40Ibid. 
41 Id. at 215, citing United States v. Sealy Corp., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); Topco Assocs. 
v. United States, 405 U.S. 596 (1972).. 
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independent bedding manufacturers. Sealy then licensed each of the 
manufacturers to produce under the Sealy name in exclusive territories, and the 
Supreme Court found a horizontal territorial division scheme notwithstanding that 
the market division emanated from a single “firm.” 
Nevertheless, the First Circuit ultimately found for the defendants because the 
plaintiffs had failed to prove a relevant market.42 
 
                                                 
42Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 284 F.3d 47, 59-61 (1st Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 
537 US 885 (2002).. 
